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We investigate the interactions between countries of the discretionary component 
of national fiscal policies (i.e. the cyclically- and interest-adjusted part of fiscal 
policy), therefore observing and investigating the part of public spending and tax 
receipts on which governments keep full discretion. Our sample covers 18 OECD 
countries, during the 1974-2008 period. First, we build a measure of such 
discretionary fiscal policy, considered as the residual component of a VAR model, 
and compute the measure for the full sample. Drawing on this new dataset, the 
second step provides estimates of discretionary fiscal policy interactions between 
countries of the sample. Our results highlight the existence of interactions 
between neighboring countries' public decisions, where neighborhood is defined 
by economic leadership as well as geography. We also find evidence of an 
opportunistic behavior of OECD countries' governments for the discretionary 
public spending. Finally, the disciplining device of the European Union fiscal 
framework is shown to be ineffective. 
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   Introduction 
 
Are national fiscal policies under external influence? A positive answer to this question 
could help design and promote good practices in fiscal policy design. Even more so if 
such external influence does not arise through (potentially) binding institutions – such as 
the Stability and Growth Pact in the European Union – or through peer pressure. On the 
contrary, if countries influence one another simply by adopting the same kind of 
behavior, then good practices could spread by the pure virtue of imitation. 
 
The idea that public policies might diffuse from one country to another is not new: it has 
been developed, e.g. in the literature dedicated to yardstick competition (see Besley and 
Case, 1995), tax competition (see Wilson, 1999), coordination issues (see Oudiz and 
Sachs, 1984, for a seminal contribution), capital account policies (see Steiner, 2010), as 
well as in political science (see Gilardi, 2010, for a recent contribution). Though binding 
fiscal rules and peer pressure have already been studied extensively so far (see, e.g., 
Hallerberg et al., 2009, for the European case), it remains to be investigated, as far as tax 
and fiscal policies are concerned, whether other means for such diffusion, i.e. imitation, 
are possible. However, it first has to be proven that a country's tax or fiscal policy 
influences other countries'. 
 
Our aim in this paper is to discover if such other influences exist. Defining a 
discretionary policy is therefore a prerequisite to studying behavioral interactions 
between governments: only the part of public spending and/or tax receipts on which 
governments fully retain control can be used strategically in response to other 
governments’ behaviors.  
 
Before dealing with measurement issues, it remains to be explained how discretionary 
fiscal policies might look like. As is well known, there is only one publicized yearly 
budget by country. Nevertheless, supplements to the budget are always possible at any 
time, stemming from changes in, say, welfare benefits, public employees’ wages 4 
 
following a new collective agreement, or new tax exemptions. These unexpected 
supplements at the time of adoption of the yearly budget are common practice, and can 
use the legal possibility (sometimes obligation) of mid-year budget review but, in many 
countries, they can be proposed to the legislature at any moment (see OECD, 2004). For 
instance in the UK, the end-of-the-year budget is substantially revised each year in 
comparison with the Pre-Budget Report which serves as a basis for preparing the UK 
yearly budget. Among the reasons explaining the revisions, one can find the effects of 
forecasting changes, which are not directly attributable to policy decisions, but also 
effects of discretionary changes, which are. Moreover, no OECD country provides a limit 
to these supplementary budgets, though the practice is generally to limit their size 
(OECD, 2004). Mid-year budget, plus the possibility of supplementary budgets, when 
they include discretionary changes, may affect the fiscal policy outcome of the current 
fiscal year, but only marginally. However, their unexpected essence is what counts in the 
end: expected changes are incorporated in private expectations by agents who can smooth 
their revenues and profits accordingly; this is not possible with unexpected changes 
which may therefore have a dynamic real effect on private consumption and investment 
until the new policy measures have become common knowledge. Hence, discretionary 
policy measures have no neutral macroeconomic effect, even in a rational expectations 
setting. 
 
Assessing these measures is not straightforward, however, and various attempts have 
been made in the literature to extract or reveal discretionary fiscal measures (Beetsma 
and Giuliodori, 2008, 2010a; Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Mountford and Uhlig, 2009; 
Ramey and Shapiro, 1998; Romer and Romer, 2009, 2010)
1. We will briefly review these 
methods in the next section. It can nevertheless be stated that, except the studies by 
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2008, 2010a), none questions the issue of external influences on 
the adoption of the new policy measures and they generally focus on one country, while 
our scope is much broader. 
 
                                                 
1 See Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010b) for a review on discretionary fiscal policy, where they pay attention 
to estimates in the open economy. Exchange rates and current accounts are out of the scope of this 
contribution.  5 
 
In order to deal with external influence on the design of discretionary fiscal policy, we 
provide two contributions to the literature. First, we define and provide, as a first step, a 
measure of discretionary fiscal policy for 18 OECD countries, throughout the 1974-2008 
period. Two measures are computed: a discretionary (i.e. a cyclically- and interest-
adjusted) measure of public spending and a discretionary (i.e. a cyclically-adjusted) 
measure of tax receipts. Second, we measure country interactions in discretionary tax or 
fiscal policy. As such, we consider several weight matrices - to check if influences among 
countries are driven by pure chance or by a systematic pattern - and different political 
variables that could not be driven away by the first step and may explain why countries 
imitate each other. As such, our approach provides a new way to look at the problem, by 
cross-breeding two methodologies established in their respective fields and never 
combined before, despite the potential fecundity of this combination. 
 
The literature on fiscal policy, its determinants and consequences is abundant. There are 
broadly two strands of literature: a macro-founded literature and a micro-founded 
literature. On the macroeconomic side, only a few papers have addressed the question of 
the measure and determinants of reciprocal influences in discretionary fiscal policy. 
Giuliodori and Beetsma (2008) analyze the interdependence of fiscal policies, and in 
particular deficits, among European Union countries using an empirical analysis based on 
real-time fiscal data. They find some evidence of fiscal policy interdependence, with the 
fiscal plans of the large countries affecting the fiscal plans of the small countries, but not 
vice versa. However, they restrict attention to fiscal plans, i.e. measures announced ex 
ante by European Union governments where they (have to) internalize how they will 
abide by the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact
2. Though fiscal plans to address 
European recommendations of fiscal disciplining are included in discretionary fiscal 
policies, the latter cannot be restricted to them: governments might modify their fiscal 
policy during a year without justifying it on grounds of fiscal obedience to a European 
rule: ex post data are necessary to reveal such a modification. Moreover, the scope for 
                                                 
 
2 Giuliodori and Beetsma (2008) use OECD forecasts in order to escape political use of fiscal forecasts by 
governments. However, given that OECD figures come from governmental institutions, OECD forecasts 
are blurred by political matters, as Giuliodori and Beetsma (2008) acknowledge: economic forecasts can be 
expected to abide ex ante by the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact.  6 
 
discretionary fiscal interactions may go beyond the EU area. Beetsma and Giuliodori 
(2010a) made also use of real-time fiscal data in the OECD, but they paid much attention 
to the changes in domestic fiscal plans which were driven by changes in cyclical 
conditions, not to external interactions. 
 
Concerning discretionary policy, Agnello and Cimadomo (2009) look at the revenue side 
of the government budget of the European Union countries, to investigate if discretionary 
measures have been implemented in reaction to economic fluctuations. They establish 
that legislated changes in taxes and social security contributions have responded in a 
strongly pro-cyclical way to the business cycle. However, not only their measure of 
discretionary fiscal policy differs from ours (and looks at the revenue side only, while we 
use a more encompassing measure), but they consider EU countries, in contrast to our 
larger sample of OECD countries. 
 
Neely and Rapach (2009) analyze co-movements in four measures of budget surpluses 
for 18 OECD countries for 1980–2008 with a dynamic latent factor model. They show 
that the world factor in national budget surpluses declines substantially in the 1980s and 
then rises throughout much of the 1990s to a peak in 2000, before declining again. This 
world factor explains a substantial portion of the variability in budget surpluses across 
countries they exhibit. Though they document a common trend, their modeling strategy 
does not allow them to check if the common trend is not in fact driven by some of their 
sample countries' influence. Moreover, it does not allow them to work on the 
determinants of the interrelations they exhibit. Here, not only do we work on 
discretionary fiscal policy (and not on aggregates that may be subject to other influences, 
such as the generalization of the welfare state, along the line of the case made by 
Lindbeck, 2008), but we deepen the analysis by uncovering the origins of the reciprocal 
national influences. 
 
There is a second strand of literature, which is micro-founded and that focuses on 
spending interactions among countries or states (Case et al., 1993; Figlio et al., 1999; 
Baicker, 2001; Redoano, 2003, 2007). For instance, Case et al. (1993) estimate the effect 7 
 
of one State’s spending on that of its neighbors using a spatial lag model. Authors find 
that States’ per capita expenditures are positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with their 
neighbors’ spending. These results are conﬁrmed by Figlio et al. (1999), who check the 
existence of spillovers in welfare spending. Baicker (2001) also ﬁnds that each dollar of 
State spending causes spending in neighboring states to increase by 37 to 88 cents. 
Finally, Redoano (2003) estimates reaction functions for taxes, public expenditures, both 
aggregated and disaggregated, using a dataset including EU countries for the period 
1985–1995. She ﬁnds that governments behave strategically with respect to those 
expenditures that are more directly comparable, such as expenditures in education: An 
increase by one dollar spent in education by the neighbors increases the same expenditure 
in a country by over 40 cents. Nevertheless, to our knowledge, all these papers use broad 
measures for spending and gross fiscal data. We believe that to properly investigate 
interactions between countries, we need to isolate the sole part which is in the hand of 
policy makers. This is the discretionary part of public spending and tax receipts which are 
fully under control by governments. 
 
Our results show that interactions do exist among our sample countries. Interestingly, 
these interactions are all the more important that countries are close (closeness being 
defined by relative per capita GDP or by geographic distance). Another important result 
is that political cycles are influential, as we find evidence of an opportunistic behavior of 
OECD countries' governments for discretionary public spending. Finally, the disciplining 
device of the EU fiscal framework is shown to be ineffective. 
 
We proceed in two steps. In section 2, we detail the data on which we rely, then define 
and compute our measure of discretionary fiscal policy. In section 3, we provide 
estimates of interactions among OECD countries, while Section 4 tests for the 
determinants of these interactions. Finally, section 5 contains our conclusions and 
provides hints for further research. 
 8 
 
1.  Measuring discretion in fiscal policy 
 
It is well-known that macro-fiscal data are blurred by many influences that make it 
difficult to extract their discretionary part. The latter part, however, is important to gauge 
fiscal policy’s design and effectiveness because it is the sole part that is in the hands of 
policymakers. Consequently, this is the part for which policymakers can be made 
accountable. In the following, we will concentrate on policy design rather than 
effectiveness.  
 
In order to proceed with extractions of discretionary fiscal stances, adjustments to 
interactions with other policies (from central banks and foreign policymakers' decisions) 
have to be implemented, and other adjustments to business-related cyclical variations are 
also required. In the end, it is thus possible to relate discretionary fiscal policy in one 
country to its counterpart in another country and to ask whether a causal relationship 
might appear, whether discretionary interactions (if they do exist) change with political 
closeness, with geographical borders, with good and bad times, etc., and how these 
interactions occur: between public expenditures and between tax policy.  
 
Three different approaches for measuring the discretionary part of fiscal policy have 
already been followed. First, Romer and Romer (2009, 2010) made use of their (1989) 
narrative approach on monetary policy for tax policy issues
3: they gathered information 
on episodes of new discretionary tax changes that successive US governments 
implemented every year, distinguishing these changes according to four different sets of 
motivation: financing a new spending program, reducing past deficits, implementing a 
countercyclical policy or raising economic growth in the long run. Then, they assessed 
the influence of some “shocks” to public spending and the economy. Though the 
approach is very appealing as it sticks to “real-time” and concrete discretionary fiscal 
episodes, it remains that gathering the same kind and quality of information for 18 
countries is a task loaded with methodological issues. Moreover, in an international 
setting, it might well be in the end that identified discretionary fiscal shocks using the 
                                                 
3 The seminal paper was Ramey and Shapiro (1998). 9 
 
narrative approach, which would mainly consist in fixing a dummy variable rather than 
estimated pure tax shocks expressed in percentage points of GDP as in Romer and Romer 
(2009, 2010), might not be able to trace back interactions with delayed effects of other 
large fiscal shocks.  
 
Second, Mountford and Uhlig (2009) identify fiscal shocks in the case of the US, using 
VAR with sign restrictions on the dynamics of the fiscal variables, and imposing 
orthogonality to a business cycle shock and a monetary policy shock.
4 In the first case, 
the fiscal shock is meant to be clearly disconnected to automatic stabilizers whereas, in 
the second case, the fiscal shock is separated from monetary policy interferences. Though 
the identifying assumptions “are close to minimal” according to the authors, the 
identification procedure is not immune from prerequisites which somewhat blur the 
relevance of an empirical characterization of discretionary fiscal policy. As for the 
identification of the business cycle shock, the assumption that it requires a co-movement 
of consumption, GDP and non-residential investment for four quarters following the 
shock may not perfectly characterize automatic stabilizers. The latter should start playing 
either if a shock on consumption or a shock on non-residential investment occurred, not 
because both variables co-move. Thus, identifying the date of the discretionary policy can 
be difficult. Let us take an example. As reported in figure 1, neither the negative US real 
GDP growth rate of 2008Q1, nor the consecutive third and fourth quarters of 2008 of 
negative US real GDP growth rate can be labeled “business cycle shocks” according to 
Mountford and Uhlig (2009). As a consequence, if we were to apply Mountford and 
Uhlig (2009)’s identification procedure beyond 2000, the end of their sample, US fiscal 
shocks during 2008 would not be orthogonal to the business cycle: discretionary fiscal 
policy and the automatic stabilizers could not be easily separated.  
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
Third, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) used Structural VARs to extract the discretionary 
part of fiscal policy in a dynamic and a-theoretical model in which they assume that GDP 
                                                 
4 Canova and Pappa (2007) identify fiscal shocks, at the regional level in the case of the US. 10 
 
reacts sluggishly to fiscal policy shocks. In contrast with Mounford and Uhlig (2009), 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) cannot deal with lags between the announcement and 
implementation of changes in fiscal policy. However, their identification of fiscal policy 
shocks depends on computed elasticities of pairs of the dependent variables which do not 
require any type of restrictions. Because the method can be made automatically 
systematic, it can be applied to many countries. Recent applications to France (Biau and 
Girard, 2005), Ireland (Benetrix and Lane, 2009), Italy (Giordano et al., 2007), the UK 
(Creel et al., 2009), and the Euro area taken as a whole (Burriel et al., 2010) testify for 
this property. Using this methodology, we provide a comparative assessment for 18 
OECD countries. 
 
In the following, we describe the method to obtain adjusted fiscal data that characterize 
the discretionary part of gross fiscal data. We obtain discretionary public spending and 
tax receipts data for 18 OECD countries between 1974 and 2008. Gross data were taken 
from the OECD database. Public spending data were not free of net interest: our choice 
was dictated by missing net-of-interest spending data in a few countries. Anyway, 
spending data were finally adjusted for long-run interest rates (except in Greece where 
only short-run interest rates were available for the entire period). The list of countries is 
the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, 
France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden 
and the United States.
5 
 
For each country, a single VAR model has been estimated. Let  ,,  ,     a n d g ry τ π  denote 
respectively the values of government spending, tax revenues, consumer inflation, the 
long-term interest rate and GDP growth. Public finance variables are expressed in percent 
of GDP; all variables are expressed in percentage. Let Yt and Ut denote the vector of 
endogenous variables and of the reduced-form residuals of the VAR, respectively. The 
reduced form VAR can be written: 
                                                 
5 Ideally, one would use quarterly data. However, quarterly public finance data are, more often than not, 
interpolations of yearly data (see also Giuliodori and Beetsma, 2010a, for complementary justifications). 
Though the limitation has to be kept in mind, making use of quarterly data would clearly blur the 
information we want to reveal. 11 
 
tt - 1 t Y= A ( L ) Y + U 
where  [,, ] ' Y,  ,   tt t t t t gy r τ π =  and  ,,,, , [,,, ] ' t U,   g tt y tt r t uuuuu τπ = .  A(L) is the L-year lag 
operator. With respect to the usual tests (Akaike information criterion, Schwartz 
information criterion), the optimal lag has been set equal to 3 for all countries. Except in 
Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom, where Johansen cointegration tests point to the 
existence of one cointegration equation (at 1 %) for each country, the remaining 15 
countries do not show a significant cointegration relation. For these 15 countries, a 
VECM is not required; for the first three countries, and for the sake of comparison with 
the remaining 15, we decided not to implement a VECM experiment. We thus first 
performed a canonical VAR model.  
 
However, the residuals of this VAR model are uninformative on the response of 
endogenous variables to shocks: they are only estimation errors. Hence, in order to 
extract the discretionary part of fiscal data – public spending and tax receipts-, one has to 
isolate the structural part of the respective canonical residual. Thus, while the canonical 
residual of, say, the tax receipt collects information on all the unexpected movements of 
that variable, the corresponding structural residual is obtained by eliminating all the 
instantaneous feedback mechanisms triggered by evolutions of the other endogenous 
variables.  
 
The identification methodology consists in isolating structural residuals according to the 
following procedure. Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we begin with by writing 
the reduced form canonical residuals of the two fiscal policy variables as linear 
combinations of the structural and automatic components: 
,, ,, ,, , ,
,, ,, ,, , ,
g tg y y tgtg r r t g t









                   (1) 
where  ,, and g tt ee τ  are the structural shocks to the two fiscal policy variables. The first 
three terms on the RHS of each equation in block (1) capture the automatic responses of 
fiscal policy to a change in GDP growth, in inflation and in the interest rate (the 12 
 
elasticities, denoted by α ). The last term captures the structural policy component which 
will be interpreted as the discretionary component.  
 
Elasticities ( ,y τ α , , g y α , , g π α , , τ π α , , g r α , ,r τ α ) are computed as the estimation of the log 
change of the variable – the canonical residual on public spending or tax receipts - on the 
contemporary log change of either GDP, inflation, or the interest rate
6.  
 
After this step, canonical residuals are corrected for GDP growth (the automatic 
stabilisers), inflation and interest rate variations, in order to extract the respective 
discretionary parts of spending and tax variables. We can consequently define the 
cyclically-adjusted (CA) public spending and tax receipts as their respective canonical 
residuals net of the effects of the other contemporaneous endogenous variables, hence: 
,, , ,, ,, , ,




g tg t g y y tgtg r r t g t
CA
tt y y t tr r t t
uu u u u e
uu u u u e
ππ
ττ τ τ π πτ τ
ααα
ααα
≡− + + =
≡− + + =
      (2) 
 
As a consequence, without any theoretical priors, estimations errors of the canonical 
VAR are adjusted for changes in the macroeconomic environment. The ensuing structural 
component can be interpreted as discretionary because it is neither related to the other 
endogenous variables nor to their unexpected variations. 
 
Though the method owes to Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the present elaboration does 
not completely endorse their identification strategy. Beyond the introduction of automatic 
responses to macroeconomic shocks in the adjusted residual of public spending and tax 
receipts, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) adjusted public spending (tax receipts) for the 
instantaneous interaction with tax receipts (public spending). Nevertheless, their 
identification methodology required to fix to zero one of these two potential interactions: 
                                                 
6 Two other computation methodologies could have been implemented. First, taking all the taxes into 
account (from income to social contributions), one could compute a weighted-average of tax elasticities 
where weights would depend on the respective contribution of taxes to tax revenues. Second, like in 
Blanchard and Perotti, (2002), overall tax elasticity to GDP could be a weighted average of the product of 
the elasticity of each tax to its own base and the elasticity of its tax base to GDP. The methodology which 
was preferred in this paper is the simplest to be performed uniformly for a large sample of countries.  13 
 
identifying one structural residual – e.g. the public spending one - as the canonical 
residual – on public spending -, it is possible to regress the second canonical residual – on 
tax receipts – on the first one, and identifying the new residual as the second structural 
residual – on tax receipts -. Such an assumption however requires taking step in the 
debate between two competing theories: the “Spend & Tax” and the “Tax & Spend” 
public finance frameworks (see Musgrave, 1966), depending on which variable must be 
constrained by the other when designing policy action. Within the VAR model, a first 
case arises where public spending is left free to affect taxes but not the opposite. In a 
second case, tax receipts are left free to affect public spending but not the opposite. 
Because there are no a priori reasons to consider that one of these frameworks fits better 
than the other for all countries at any time, we do not follow this step in the identification 
of structural components. 
 
Thus we escape an unresolved discussion on the best fiscal framework for a sample of 18 
countries over 40 years. Nevertheless, we do not escape the strategic issue completely: 
though we fix all the contemporaneous interactions to zero, we only do so at the 
macroeconomic stage of the empirical procedure; in the spatial stage of it, the analysis of 
the strategic interactions across tax or fiscal policies is performed. 
 
It must also be acknowledged that the method introduces some new elements in 
comparison with Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Since we include the inflation and the 
interest rates (as in Perotti, 2004), we can adjust fiscal variables for a wide array of 
macroeconomic shocks. Under the assumption that long-term interest rates are related to 
short-term rates according to the yield curve, the adjustment of fiscal data can be 
interpreted as involving correction for changes in monetary policy. And, for what 
concerns the adjustment for foreign fiscal policies, the spatial econometric methods we 
implement below is a novelty in the literature on discretionary components of fiscal 
policy. 
 
The values of elasticities are reported in Table 1. Expected signs are the following. Public 
spending (on GDP) should decrease contemporaneously with GDP, and should increase 14 
 
contemporaneously with long term interest rates (provided public debt is mostly financed 
at floating rates), but the sign of the elasticity of public spending (on GDP) towards 
inflation depends on the indexation of public spending on actual inflation. The sign of the 
elasticity of tax receipts (on GDP) towards GDP depends on the tax structure: the more 
progressive the tax system, the larger (and positive) the elasticity; if taxes are lump-sum 
or exemptions are numerous, the elasticity can be negative: higher growth means lower 
tax receipts in proportion of GDP. Tax receipts (on GDP) should respond positively, 
provided net interests are charged with taxes; however, the sign of the related elasticity 
could as well be indeterminate, as a higher long term interest rate also reduces the values 
of bonds and stocks; consequently, reduced wealth can lead to lower tax receipts. Finally, 
the elasticity of tax receipts (on GDP) towards inflation depends on the indexation 
procedure of tax brackets. 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
Reported elasticities give a very diverse picture for the different countries involved under 
review. It is noteworthy that the sole elasticity which sign is clearly determinate,  , g y α , is 
always negative, as expected, and statistically significant for most countries. Other 
elasticities testify for variations between countries in terms of degrees of indexation and 
tax structures. The contemporaneous impact of long term interest rates on public 
spending is often not statistically significant. This is not surprising as one can expect a 
relative inertia of total public spending vis-à-vis a short term change in the nominal long 
term interest rate.  
 
Estimated discretionary parts of public spending and tax receipts are presented in the 
appendix for the 18 countries of the sample. As a matter of comparison, we report in 
figure 2 the government revenue shocks estimated by Mountford and Uhlig (2009), 
exogenous tax changes computed by Romer and Romer (2010), and our estimated 
discretionary part of tax receipts, all three in the case of the US. At first sight, our method 
gives frequent tax shocks, like Mountford and Uhlig (2009). A closer look shows that the 
three methods point to a discretionary increase in taxes in 1981, 1987 and 1991, and to a 15 
 
decrease in 1982 and 1988. All in all, our method gives consistent results with other 
methods.  
 
Insert Figure 2 
 
Given the results obtained in this first step, we now turn to the investigation of the 
potential spatial interactions between the sample countries. 
 
2.  Assessing fiscal policy interactions between OECD countries 
 
Traditionally, empirical models of public policies relate public spending or tax receipts to 
variables reflecting socio-economic and political characteristics of the country (or 
region). This amounts to assuming that fiscal policies are only influenced by observed 
national features. Under a linear specification, such a view leads one to estimate the 










kt u  are the per capita discretionary spending (or tax receipts) of the  1, iN =  
countries,  X is the set of exogenous national socio-economic characteristics, λi is a 
country fixed effect, λt is a period fixed effect and ε , a vector of i.i.d error terms. 
 
However, strategic interactions among governments have been one of the central issues 
in theoretical public finance for the two last decades at least (see the survey by Wilson, 
1999). As a consequence, spatial econometric techniques have recently been used to 
estimate inter-governmental interaction models (see Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2005). 
Building on the spatial econometric method developed by Anselin (1988), the model in 
equation (3) is then augmented to include the spatially lagged dependent variable: 
,,
,, , ,
CA i CA j
kt it i t it kt uW u X ρ βλλε =+ + + +    with ij ≠    (4) 
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In this spatially lagged model, W is a weight matrix that assigns “neighbors” to each 
country; the spatial lagged variable WY is a weighted average of all other countries’ fiscal 
policy,  ρ  being the spatial autoregressive coefficient, which gives the sign and the 
intensity of the impact of “neighboring” fiscal policies on one country’s public decision. 
 
A negative ρ  will imply that expenditure spillovers explain the spatial correlation 
between countries decisions (Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2005). On the contrary, when ρ  
is positive, a form of imitation (mimicking, i.e. fiscal competition or yardstick 
competition) explains the observed interaction. For example, in the presence of tax base 
mobility, the fiscal policy of a government may affect the budget constraints of other 
governments, through capital migration (Wilson, 1999). This is the fiscal competition for 
mobile resources assumption. In the yardstick competition theory, information on the 
fiscal policy of the neighbor governments acts as a yardstick for the electorate in any 
given country. As a result, any country’s citizens will compare the performance of their 
own policymakers to the neighboring ones. This encourages mimicking behavior from 
governments, as they do not want to be stigmatized (Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 
1995). 
 
Finally, a spatial auto-correlation pattern may simply reflect common shocks affecting 
public policy or the omission of variables (such as country characteristics) that are 
spatially dependent (Manski, 1993). In this case, we have a spatial autoregressive process 




kt it i t it uX β λλε =+ + +  and  ,, , it it W j tm ε γε = +      (5) 
where γ  is the spatial correlation coefficient, W a weight matrix and m  a vector of i.i.d. 
error terms. 
 
Turning to estimation techniques, Anselin (1988) shows that, due to an endogeneity bias, 
OLS estimators are inconsistent when estimating spatial lag and spatial error models. 
However, instrumental variables (IV) or maximum likelihood (ML) estimation methods 
lead to consistent estimators (Brueckner, 2003; Elhorst, 2003).  17 
 
 
The weight matrix, denoted W, defines the structure of the interaction, the 
“neighborhood” among countries. Since an a priori definition of interaction may 
arbitrarily influence the estimations results, we will test the robustness of our fiscal policy 
interaction model by using five different criteria, i.e. five different weight matrices. 
 
First, to test whether our results are not an artifact of the statistical procedure in which the 
neighborhood variable picks up the effect of any random set of countries, we build an 
intentionally absurd weighting scheme.  
 
Traditionally, to test fiscal competition, yardstick competition or spillover effects in 
which neighborhood is a central feature, most empirical papers use weight matrices based 
on geographical distance or simple contiguity. Following the relevant empirical literature, 
we have chosen a common geographical definition of neighborhood based on the 
Euclidean distance between countries (dij).
7 This scheme is given by the weight matrix 
W
DIST and imposes a smooth distance decay with weights wij, given by 1/dij when i is 
different from j (otherwise wij = 0).  
 
A third set of matrix is based on economic criteria
8. We consider the case where countries 
follow an economic leader, the latter being defined by her GDP per capita. The matrix 
W
GDPL assigns higher weights to countries j with higher GDP per capita: wij = GDPj 
/ j jGDP ∑  if i is different from j, and 0 otherwise. We are thus able to assess size effects. 
We clearly set the leader country. Matrix USLEADER gives a coefficient equal to 1 if 
country j is the United States and 0 otherwise. Trade flows between countries may also be 
a source of mimicking. As for W
TRADE , country i is closer to country j than to country k if 
the share of trade with j is higher than the share of trade with k in the total trade of 
country i.  
                                                 
7 Geodesic distances are calculated following the great circle formula, which uses the geographic 
coordinates of the capital cities (CEPII data base). 
8 See Case et al. (1993) and Baicker (2005) for a discussion on these matrices, defining 




It is conventional in the empirical spatial literature that all these weight matrices are 
standardized so that the elements of each row sum to 1. Besides, we also include in our 
model some control variables reflecting the impact of differences in socio-economic and 
political factors grouped in the vector X in (3). Following the empirical literature, we 
include some explanatory variables that might affect fiscal policies. We expect no 
important impact of these variables, in validation of the first step of the empirical 
procedure. It has to be noted that the economic resource variables such as GDP per 
capita, which can be used as a measure of country income, have been removed from this 
step in the empirical procedure since it was already included in the first one (see above). 
 
Our data set includes the above 18 OECD countries, considered over a period of 34 years 
(1975-2008). Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2 in appendix. 
 
The first data set of control variables, as is traditional in  the literature, is composed of 
socio-demographic variables, such as unemployment rate, population density, and shares 
of under 14 (young people) and over 65 year-old in the population (old people). All these 
variables are available from the AMECO database (European Commission, Economic 
and Financial affairs). They are expected to exhibit a positive sign as they might reflect 
higher needs of the population they designate. The variable (old people) is designed to 
capture the political demand for social services by the older members of the electorate. 
This segment of the population constitutes an interest group with growing political 
power, and the variable (old people) is expected to be positively related to the size of the 
government.  
 
A second group of control variables includes political data collected from the Database of 
Political Institutions (DPI, see Beck et al., 2001). Left is a dummy variable for the 
country partisan affiliation, which takes the value 1 if the chief executive of country i in 
year t belongs to a left-wing party, and 0 otherwise. We also introduce dummies for the 
electoral cycle. Election year (t) is a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if there is a 
legislative election in year t. Election year t-1 (resp. t+1) is a dummy variable, which 19 
 
takes the value 1 the year before (resp. after) the legislative election, and zero otherwise. 
If there is a trend for an opportunistic political business cycle during the legislative 
legislature, we will observe higher discretionary public spending and lower tax receipts 
the year before the election or the election year. 
 
As 13 countries of our sample are members of the European Union, the last group of 
explanatory variables deals with EU features. We introduce three dummies respectively 
for EU membership, for Eurozone membership and for the respect of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). EU membership and Eurozone membership take the value 1 if the 
country i in year t belongs respectively to the EU and to the Eurozone, zero otherwise. 
SGP takes the value 1 if the EU country i’s deficit does not respect the SGP in year t, and 
zero otherwise. A negative (positive) sign for this parameter will appear if the SGP is a 
constraint or a disciplining device for the manipulation of discretionary spending (taxes) 
in EU countries experimenting high deficits. Conversely, a positive (negative) sign will 
emphasize the ineffectiveness of the disciplining device for discretionary spending 
(taxes).  
 
Our estimation strategy is as follows. We first estimate (3) using OLS without taking into 
account the potential influence of the fiscal policy set by other countries. Because serial 
correlation in panel data models biases the standard errors and causes the results to be 
less efficient, we performed the Wooldridge test (2002) to identify potential serial 
correlation in the idiosyncratic error term. This test does not detect the presence of such 
correlation. We then run the appropriate spatial tests based on the Lagrange multiplier 
tests in their robust version, which can detect the presence of spatial lag dependence and 
spatial error dependence (see Anselin et al., 1996). We also use them in their robust 
version which means that the robust LM-lag tests for lag dependency in presence of 
missing error and the robust LM-ERR tests for error dependence in presence of missing 
lag. If the LM test for spatial lag is more significant than the LM test for spatial error, and 
the robust LM test for spatial lag is significant but the robust LM test for spatial error is 20 
 
not, then the appropriate model is the spatial lag model (Anselin and Florax, 1995).
9 We 
find spatial lag dependency for all the weighting schemes we consider.
10  
 
We then estimate the full model (4), the Y variable being our first step u
CA residuals, 
taking into account the influence of the other countries’ fiscal policies (weighted 
spending decisions or tax receipts) using the maximum likelihood (ML) method.
11 As 
macroeconomic shocks that could be common to all countries have already been taken 
into account in the first step of the empirical procedure, we do not need to include time 
dummies. Estimation results for discretionary spending decisions and tax receipts are 
shown in Tables 3a and 3b.  
 
Insert Table 3a 
 
Insert Table 3b 
 
According to estimates reported in tables 4a and 4b, we find both a significant and 
positive sign for the coefficient associated with the “neighboring” OECD countries' 
decisions in discretionary public expenditures and tax receipts, except for the absurd 
matrix. The estimation results confirm the existence of fiscal policy interactions for all 
weighting schemes, either based on geographical proximity or on economic leadership. 
This implies that geographically close countries tend to imitate each other, when they set 
their discretionary fiscal policy. Countries also mimic their main trade partners and 
                                                 
9 Conversely, if the LM test for spatial error is more significant than the LM test for spatial lag and the 
robust LM test for spatial error is significant but the robust LM test for spatial lag is not, then the 
appropriate specification is the spatial error model. 
10 LM tests estimation results are not shown in this paper, but are available upon request from the authors. 
11 Furthermore, the normality of the residuals (the dependent variables) cannot be rejected, as the Shapiro-
Wilk reveals (not shown here for space convenience but available on request). Non-normality could include 
overall skewness, overall tail weight differing from normal, individual outliers. Shapiro-Wilk test collapses 
all that onto one dimension by quantifying the straightness of a normal probability plot. The departure from 
a normal distribution is not statistically significant using this test.  21 
 
economic leaders in the OECD like the US
12. However, there is no interaction using the 
absurd alphabetical matrix. This outcome confirms that our results are not an artifact of 
the statistical procedure nor the effect of common shocks to countries of our sample but 
come from mimicking between countries.  
 
Result 1: There are some discretionary fiscal policy interactions between OECD 
countries. Countries tend to imitate their geographical neighbours, their trade 
partners and the economic leader of the area when they set their discretionary 
public spending or tax receipts. 
 
Let us now turn to the estimation results associated with the other explanatory variables. 
Although no parameter associated with the socio-economic or political explanatory 
variables is significant for tax receipts (a logical result, and a further proof of the fact that 
our measure of discretionary fiscal policy really measures discretion), two important 
results for public spending can be put to the fore. 
 
First, dummies associated with legislative election years indicate an opportunistic use 
(meaning, an increase) of discretionary public spending during the election year. This 
gives strong evidence of a political budget cycle for discretionary public expenditures. 
This result contradicts Brender and Drazen (2005, 2007), who find a political deficit 
cycle in a large cross-section of 74 to 106 countries, a result which is driven by the 
experience of “new democracies”. In contrast, our sample contains "mature" 
democracries. Though we rehabilitate opportunistic cycles in older democracies, it has 
thus to be recalled that our measure of fiscal policy draws on discretionary fiscal policy, 
whereas Brender and Drazen (2005, 2007) use an overall deficit, i.e. the difference 
between receipts and expenditures. Moreover, our measure does not allow to differentiate 
between measures that may be more “visible” for voters than others, and thus measures 
                                                 
12 We also check if other countries are mimicked by all other countries. We find that interactions in 
discretionary tax receipts are significant at 5% with Germany, Ireland and Netherlands as leader. Results 
are available upon request.  22 
 
that may be more or less effective, from the incumbent’s point of view (see Drazen and 
Eslava, 2010). 
 
Result 2: There is evidence of an opportunistic behavior of OECD countries' 
governments for the discretionary public spending. 
 
Second, we find evidence of ideological effects on the discretionary spending decisions, 
as the coefficient of the partisan affiliation (Left) for the chief executive is significant and 
negative. Left-wing chief executives seem to set lower discretionary public expenditures 
than right-wing chief executives. As shown by the coefficient on the COAL*LEFT 
variable, this result is not driven by the fact that Left-wing governments are more often 
than their Right-wing counterpart, members of a ruling coalition.  
 
Empirics on the relationship between partisan politics and public finance, drawing on a 
panel of advanced economies, have generally come to mixed results (see Cusack, 1999, 
for a survey). Stated briefly, some showed that left-wing governments were more 
favorably inclined to high deficits or spending (see Cusack, 1997), though their influence 
was a small one in comparison with right-wing governments (see Blais et al., 1993, 
1996), whereas some argued that such an influence was contingent on macroeconomic 
conditions (Carlsen, 1997; Cusack, 1999) and has decreased over time with the larger 
openness of advanced economies (Cusack, 1999). In a recent paper dedicated to public 
budgeting in France, Baumgartner et al. (2009) show that since 1981, no matter which 
political type of government has been in power, limited growth in spending has been the 
rule. Because right-wing governments had always been in power between 1958 and 1981, 
Baumgartner et al. (2009) show that though differences are small, right-wing 
governments have been the highest spenders.  
 
Hence, our result is not completely surprising. Contrary to the above-mentioned 
literature, it stems from the use of discretionary fiscal measures and thus does not hinge 23 
 
on spending measures like unemployment benefits which are supposedly of greater 
matter for left-wing governments than for right-wing ones, supposedly weighing the costs 
of inflation higher. As a matter of fact, a complementary interpretation of the negative 
coefficient associated with the (Left) variable, could be that left-wing governments are 
more concerned than right-wing ones by the policy consequences of discretionary fiscal 
policy. On the contrary, right-wing governments could be more prone to use such a 
policy if they think it is associated with political (electoral) gains, along the lines of 
Gilardi’s results (2010) with unemployment benefit policy. Moreover, our result is not 
surprising if a strategic use of debt exists, à la Persson and Svensson (1989), a hypothesis 
that can be consistent with this result and could not have been exhibited before. Overall 
public spending might well be raised by incumbents, hence feeding debt growth, if they 
fear they will not be reelected, hence newly elected governments have no choice but to 
reduce spending whatever the economic conditions: discretionary public spending must 
fall. Our result would fit this analysis provided the incumbent would come from the 
Right, whereas the newly elected government would come from the Left. 
 
Result 3: Left-wing chief executives set lower discretionary public spending.  
 
The remaining explanatory variables based on socio-demographic features 
(unemployment rate, young people, old people, and population densities) and on 
European characteristics (EU and Eurozone memberships dummies) exhibit the expected 
sign though they never appear as significant. Once again, this confirms that only the 
discretionary components of fiscal policy are present in our dependent variables (i.e., the 
first step has purged the fiscal data and our measure correctly estimates discretionary 
impulses). The only significant explanatory variable is the SGP dummy, which sign is 
positive in the discretionary public spending equation. The sign is consistently negative 
in the discretionary tax revenues equation, though it is not statistically significant. The 
coefficient on the SGP dummy shows that the EU fiscal framework is not effective in 
prompting a corrective effect when public deficits in the EU are above the SGP threshold. 
The disciplining device of the SGP is not working. This result complements Fatás and 24 
 
Mihov (2003), who show that once countries are under the 3% threshold the incentives to 
go further (towards the final objective of close to balance or surplus budgets) are much 
weaker and countries reduce their efforts.  
 
3.  Further results 
 
In this section, we first investigate the source of interdependence in national discretionary 
fiscal policies (4.1) and second, we check whether the belonging to the EU matters (4.2). 
 
3.1.  How to interpret the existence of interactions between OECD fiscal policies? 
 
We here investigate more deeply the source of interdependence in national discretionary 
fiscal policies. As stressed by Redoano (2007), the coefficient associated with the 
interaction term is not negative, so our results are not supportive of spillovers caused by 
free riding behaviors. However, the positive interaction coefficient may come from fiscal 
competition, yardstick competition, a common trend or may be the effect of similar 
exogenous shocks.  
 
First we can easily give up the last two explanations as the absurd matrix shows no sign 
of interactions. Second, to distinguish between fiscal competition and yardstick 
competition, we have to check if the spatial effect is stronger in election year. Yardstick 
competition occurs when citizens compare fiscal and spending decisions made by their 
incumbent with those of their neighbours (Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 1995). In this 
context, policy-makers will be particularly concerned about neighbour incumbents in 
election periods, and strategic interactions might be stronger at such times. A 
straightforward way of testing this hypothesis is to use election cycle variables (Redoano, 
2007; Solé-Ollé, 2003). We interact the weighted average discretionary policy of 
neighbours (Yj,t) with an election dummy (D) and estimate two interaction coefficients, 25 
 
one for the year of election ( 1 ρ ) and one for the rest of the period( 2 ρ ). We thus need to 
use a two-regime spatial lag model: 
,, ,
,1 2 , , ,, (1 )
CA i CA j CA j
kt it i t it kt kt uD W u D W u X ρ ρβ λ λ ε = +− + + + +   (6) 
 
In line with Elhorst and Fréret (2009), we use a ML estimator to deal with this specific 
model. Results are reported in Table 4 in appendix. We do not find a significant 
difference in interactions in discretionary spending. However, highly significant 
differences in the spatial interaction coefficient are found for the discretionary tax 
receipts. OECD countries mimic discretionary revenues of the economic leaders of the 
area (all GDP leaders or only US). The yardstick competition hypothesis cannot be 
rejected for discretionary tax receipts.  
 
3.2.  Does the EU matter?  
 
Since 13 countries of our sample are EU members, we estimate equation (4) on a 
subsample of European countries. The estimation results, shown in Table 5 in appendix, 
confirm the robustness of the results found in tables 4a and 4b, while the political cycle 
coefficients appear stronger for the European countries than for the whole sample. The 
coefficient of the SGP dummy is also very robust to different specifications regarding the 
weight matrices and the different samples.  
 
Another way to test if the EU matters in the interdependence of fiscal policy decisions is 
to allow two interaction coefficients whether the country i belongs or not to the EU in the 
full sample. We then estimate equation (6) on the full sample using as a dummy D for EU 
membership. In our dataset, 8 countries were EU members while at the end of the period, 
13 out of 18 are members of the EU. On the one hand, EU membership may cause more 
interdependent decisions between countries, as countries are constrained in the policy 
tools available to compete with other European countries. As stated by Redoano (2007): 
“they move in a similar competitive and institutional environment and are subject to 26 
 
similar budget and political constraints, moreover policy makers have more occasions to 
meet and discuss formally or informally their plans”. On the other hand, EU non 
members may engage in a more competitive behavior than EU countries, especially if 
they want to convince EU states to accept their future membership. Table 6 (in appendix) 
shows that the degree of interaction does not differ whether the country belongs or not to 
the EU. This result is obtained for both measures of discretionary policy.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we investigate the relationships between the discretionary components of 
fiscal policies, for a sample of 18 OECD countries, during the 1974-2008 period. In a 
first step, we build two indicators of discretionary fiscal policy, considered as the residual 
components of a VAR model: one for public spending, and one for tax receipts. 
 
The second step provides estimates of discretionary fiscal policy interactions between 
these OECD countries using spatial econometrics. Our results confirm the existence of 
interactions between neighboring countries’ public decisions, where neighborhood is 
defined by economic proximity as well as by geography. We also find evidence of an 
opportunistic behavior of OECD countries’ governments for the discretionary public 
spending, even stronger for the sub-sample of European countries. Moreover, left-wing 
chief executives seem to set lower discretionary public expenditures than right-wing chief 
executives, which could reveal the presence of a strategic use of deficits by right-wing 
incumbents. Finally, the disciplining device of the European Union fiscal framework is 
shown to be ineffective. Future research may be to investigate the link between public 
spending and tax receipts. 27 
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Table 1: Elasticities 
 
  , g y α   , g r α   , g π α   ,y τ α   ,r τ α   , τ π α  
Australia -0.03  0.05* 0.0001 0.004 0.03* 0.002 
Austria  -0.04 -0.03* -0.02  -0.03 0.005 0.002 
Belgium -0.04 -0.005  0.003 -0.02 -0.03*  -0.003 
Canada -0.04  -0.004  0.00003  -0.004  0.05  0.004 
Germany -0.03 -0.03* -0.009 -0.003 -0.02* -0.004 
Denmark  -0.02* 0.02* -0.004 -0.005 -0.02* 0.001 
Spain -0.08  0.04*  -0.03*  -0.03*  0.0006  -0.04* 
Finland  -0.03 -0.03* -0.03 -0.01* 0.10 0.0003 
France -0.02  -0.007  -0.002 -0.008 0.002 -0.002 
UK -0.05  0.09  0.008  -0.03*  0.08  0.02* 
Greece -0.09  0.02*  -0.002  -0.07  0.004  -0.005 
Ireland -0.04  0.12*  -0.007  -0.04  0.03*  -0.007 
Italy -0.06  -0.0003  -0.02*  -0.02  0.002  -0.03 
Japan -0.02*  -0.02*  -0.004  0.008  0.03*  0.003 
Nld. -0.04  0.009  0.0005  -0.02  -0.02*  0.004 
Norway -0.04 0.04*  -0.01* 0.02  0.06 0.008 
Sweden  -0.01* 0.04* -0.002 -0.007 0.002 -0.009 
USA -0.04  -0.04*  -0.01*  0.0005  0.06  0.02* 
Sources: OECD, authors’ calculations.  
*: not statistically different from 0.  
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Sources Mean Std Dev. Min Max
Unemployment rate A M E C O 7 . 0 53 . 4 61 . 1 0 1 9 . 5 0
Young people AMECO 19.88 3.25 13.74 30.90
Old people AMECO 13.99 2.35 7.91 20.03
Population density AMECO 83.03 78.96 1.15 265.50
Election year DPI
Left DPI
EU membership European Commission
Eurozone membership European Commission
SGP European Commission and AMECO
AMECO : database of the European Commission, Economic and Financial affairs





Table 3a. Estimation results-discretionary spending 
Dependent variable  Spending     
Weight matrix  WABSURD  WDIST WGDP LEADER US LEADER Wtrade     
W*Y  0.004 0.28*** 0.17***  0.06*  0.20***    
  (0.09) (3.99)  (2.62)  (1.75)  (3.66)    
Unemployment rate  0.02 0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01    
  (1.39) (1.29)  (1.29)  (1.39)  (1.26)    
Young people  0.02 0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02    
  (1.15) (1.21)  (1.31)  (1.22)  (1.33)    
Old people  0.02 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02    
  (0.63) (0.64)  (0.67)  (0.64)  (0.65)    
Population density  0.0002 0.0001  0.0001  0.0002  0.0002    
  (0.32) (0.30)  (0.31)  (0.33)  (0.34)    
Election year (t)  0.19** 0.19**  0.19**  0.19**  0.19**    
  (2.48) (2.55)  (2.56)  (2.51)  (2.55)    
Election year ( t+1)  -0.04 -0.03  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04    
  (-0.63) (-0.55)  (-0.65)  (-0.66)  (-0.58)    
Election year ( t-1)  0.11 0.12*  0.11  0.11  0.12*    
  (1.55) (1.73)  (1.52)  (1.51)  (1.73)    
Left  -0.16** -0.14*  -0.15**  -0.15**  -0.14*    
   (-2.04) (-1.89)  (-1.97)  (-2.00)  (-1.82)    
COAL LEFT  0.04 0.04  0.05  0.05  0.03    
   (0.48) (0.38)  (0.48)  (0.49)  (0.33)    
EU membership  0.003 0.0004  0.01  0.006  -0.006    
   (0.03) (0.004) (0.12)  (0.05)  (-0.06)    
Eurozone membership  0.05 0.07  0.04  0.05  0.06    
   (0.55) (0.73)  (0.49)  (0.55)  (0.74)    
SGP  0.21** 0.18*  0.20**  0.20** 0.20**    
   (2.14) (1.93)  (2.10)  (2.14)  (2.11)    
Log likelihood  -641.7  -634.3  -637.9  -639.6  -634.7    
              
Notes: 612 observations. Spatial fixed effects are included. T-Student in parentheses 




Table 3b: Estimation results-discretionary tax receipts 
Dependent variable  Tax receipts     




LEADER Wtrade     
W*Y  0.05 0.36*** 0.24***  0.07* 0.22***    
  (1.29) (5.44)  (4.03)  (1.82) (4.12)    
Unemployment rate  -0.001 -0.003  -0.003  -0.001 -0.001    
  (-0.12) (-0.28)  (-0.26)  (-0.09) (-0.11)    
Young people  -0.008 -0.003  -0.003  -0.006 -0.003    
  (-0.43) (-0.21)  (-0.19)  (-0.31) (-0.21)    
Old people  -0.000 -0.0001 0.0008  0.001  -0.0003    
  (-0.00) (-0.004) (0.03)  (0.06)  (-0.01)    
Population density  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001  -0.0001 -0.0001    
  (-0.25) (-0.28)  (-0.20)  (-0.22) (-0.23)    
Election year (t)  -0.10 -0.11  -0.10  -0.09 -0.10    
   (-1.34) (-1.54)  (-1.38)  (-1.29) (-1.40)    
Election year ( t+1)  -0.03 -0.02  -0.01  -0.02 -0.01    
   (-0.39) (-0.31)  (-0.26)  (-0.29) (-0.23)    
Election year ( t-1)  0.04 0.05  0.05  0.05 0.05    
   (0.63) (0.73)  (0.76)  (0.71) (0.73)    
Left  -0.05 -0.04  -0.05  -0.06 -0.05    
   (-0.73) (-0.62)  (-0.76)  (-0.75) (-0.70)    
COAL LEFT  -0.009 -0.03  -0.02  -0.008 -0.01    
   (-0.09) (-0.32)  (-0.18)  (-0.08) (-0.16)    
EU membership  -0.07 -0.05  -0.08  -0.07 -0.07    
   (-0.71) (-0.56)  (-0.76)  (-0.76) (-0.66)    
Eurozone membership  0.10 0.08  0.10  0.11 0.11    
   (1.13) (0.92)  (1.12)  (1.16) (1.18)    
SGP  -0.14 -0.10  -0.12  -0.14 -0.13    
   (-1.59) (-1.08)  (-1.31)  (-1.57) (-1.41)    
Log likelihood  -633.6  -622.5  -627.9  -633.3  -627.1    
              
Notes: 612 observations. Spatial fixed effects are included. T-Student in parentheses 
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US Business cycle, 2007-2009
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Nonresidential Inv. (right axis)
 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
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Sources: top figure: authors’ estimations; middle figure: excerpt from figure 1 in 
Mountford and Uhlig (2009); bottom figure: excerpt from figure 1 in Romer and Romer 
(2010). 
 
 
 